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Problems of “soft budget” constraints in intergovernmental relationships are currently at the
frontier of research in local public economics. This paper reviews the Italian experience in the
field, starting from themid-1970s up to the present period, compares it with that of other
countries, and uses it to comment upon the state of arts of the literature. The paper argues that the
soft budget constraint problem has been a rampant one in the Italian local public finance,
generating efficiency losses, lack of political accountability and undermining the soundness of
public finances. The paper inquires into the causes and possible solutions to the problem, and in
particular describes and comments upon the decentralization process of the 1990s. Finally, the
Italian debate on fiscal federalism of the 1990s is also reviewed, arguing that some of the
suggestions of this debate may be of interest more generally.
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1.  Introduction
Problems of bailouts and their economic implications have traditionally been studied with
reference to episodes of governmental intervention in the industrial and banking system (i.e.,
Dewatripont and Maskin 1995 and the literature quoted therein). Because of size, economic
relevance, or simply political connections, some firms are deemed too important to be allowed to
fail; in the event of economic difficulties, governments feel forced to step in and rescue them
financially. In turn, expectations of this behavior on the part of the government may make the
perceived budget constraint of the firms “soft” (e.g., Kornai, 1986), leading them to behave
suboptimally, say, by taking too much risk or allocating resources inefficiently.  On policy
grounds, this then raises the issue of which instruments, institutions or policies can be used to
cope with this problem, allowing or forcing governments to credibly commit not to interfere with
the functioning of the economic system.
Although less widely studied, it is important to realize that exactly the same kind of
problems may  characterize the relationship between central and local governments.
1
Undoubtedly, most local governments are for reasons of size and economic or political relevance
too important to be allowed to fail; indeed, in many countries it is not altogether clear that a local
government can actually “fail.” Furthermore, local governments are often a very important piece
of the total government; financial difficulties at the local level may then bring about difficulties
at a higher level, undermining the equilibrium of the central government’s budget. Again, this
raises the question of which policies can be introduced to eliminate or reduce the bailout
problem. In the present context, this basically means inquiring into issues such as the optimal
assignment of functions and resources to the different levels of governments, the structure and
the level of the intergovernmental transfer system, the legal constraints concerning the
availability of debt to local governments, the political rules determining the relationship between
local and central parties and politicians, and so on.
                                                          
1 Although the problem has always been known, it has raised considerable interest only recently, in particular in the
writings of policy-oriented economists working on developing economies such as Bird et al. (1995), Prud’homme
(1995) and Tanzi (1996). Theory seems to have lagged behind, however, not least because “soft budget constraint”
problems could not even arise in the standard approach to fiscal federalism (i.e.,  Oates, 1972) where central
government is supposed to have unlimited commitment powers. For recent attempts which somewhat link the design
of intergovernmental relationships with problems of soft budget constraint, see  Wildasin (1997) and  Qian and
Roland (1998). The political economy literature has made some steps further, stressing in particular the “common
pool” problem—induced by the separation between spending and financing decisions at local level—as one of the
causes of soft budget constraint; see, for instance, Tabellini and Persson (1994, 1999).6
In this paper, we pursue two tasks. First, we briefly review the Italian experience in local
public finance from the mid-1970s to the present period. We argue that the bailout problem and
the connected problem of a perceived “soft budget” constraint at the local level have been
rampant in Italian local finance for the last twenty years. This has caused severe efficiency losses
in the provision of local public good and services, induced a lack of responsiveness and
accountability of local politicians to local preferences, undermined political participation at both
local and central levels, and generated severe problems for the equilibrium of central government
finances. Second, we build on the Italian experience to comment upon the current state of
research on this issue in economics and to suggest an agenda for further work.
In particular, concerning the Italian situation, we argue that several connected reasons
were, and still are, responsible for soft budget constraint problems at the local level. First and
foremost is the mismatch between own resources and functions at the local level, resulting in a
large vertical imbalance between local tax revenues and expenditures.
2 The ultimate root of this
mismatch can be traced back to the 1948 Constitution, which mandated expenditure assignments
to local governments, while being less specific on the means and on the level of the government
which would be in charge of financing these expenditures. This constitutional ambiguity allowed
the central government in the 1970s—when a massive tax reform was introduced and some new
local governments (ordinary regions) were established—to  centralize tax revenues while
decentralizing public expenditures. This reduced the perceived cost of public expenditures at the
local level, thus stimulating an increase in local public expenditures and local deficits, which the
central government felt forced to accommodate ex post through increased transfers (e.g., Brosio
et al., 1980). The central government’s subsequent attempt to regain control of local finances by
controlling local expenditures more directly (say, by imposing ceilings on the rate of growth of
local expenditure and introducing conditional grants) was only partially successful.
A second factor was the large  overlap of functions among the different levels of
government, which reduced the accountability of local politicians and induced local governments
to free-ride on each other. A third cause of budgetary problems was the inability of the central
government to commit to a precise policy concerning local finances, defining functions, own
resources and grants to local governments in a coherent framework, and an inability to maintain
                                                          
2 On these grounds, Italy is certainly not unique. The empirical research of Stein (1999) on Latin America countries,
for instance, also offers considerable support for the existence of a systematic link between bailing out by central
government and vertical imbalance at the local level.7
that framework consistently. In turn, this lack of a committing technology on the part of the
central government can be largely traced back to the features of the Italian political system itself,
a parliamentary regime with electoral rules based on proportional representation, which typically
resulted in weak, very short-lived coalition governments.
3 As a result, it was fairly typical for
central governments to renege on the local public finance policy decided by their predecessors.
4
A fourth aggravating factor was the lack of transparency in accounting procedures at the local
level and in the formulas for intergovernmental transfers. The former made it more difficult to
identify waste in local expenditures, while the latter allowed for the lots of hidden political
exchange taking place in the setting of the intergovernmental transfers. Finally, the lack of an
adequate system of political representation at the local level often resulted in the selection of
local politicians who were hardly responsive to local preferences.
Most of the recent history of Italian local public finance can be read as an attempt to
come to terms with these problems. Since the beginning of the 1990s, several reforms have been
passed which have attempted to: 1) progressively “harden” budget constraints on local
governments, through an increase in their financial autonomy and a reduction in the transfers
paid by the central government; 2) increase the responsiveness of local politicians by passing
new electoral laws at the local level and by introducing a clearer separation between the
functions assigned to the different levels of government; 3) keep local public expenditures under
even stricter controls, by introducing cash controls on them. These attempts have only been
partially successfully so far. They succeeded in keeping at bay the rate of growth of local public
expenditures in the short term but did not remove entirely the incentives to misbehave. We
review these policies, arguing that the failure of the attempt to introduce a constitutional reform
in 1997, committing the political system to the decentralization process, can be considered as the
main cause for the limited effectiveness of these policies. Indeed, in spite of the ongoing debate
on fiscal federalism in Italy, there are worrying signs of the political system’s reverting to a re-
centralization of local policies.
                                                          
3 To be more precise, in 1993, under the pressure of a national referendum, a reform was passed which to some
extent transformed the electoral rule to a plurality. However, in the main chamber 25% of MPs are still elected with
the proportional rule.
4 The effect of different political institutions on central government ability to commit and its consequence on
expenditure and budget deficits has been studied empirically by Roubini and Sachs (1989). For an application to
local government expenditures, see Borge and Rattso (1999).8
A lively debate on decentralisation took place in Italy in the mid-1990s in anticipation of
the attempted constitutional reform. Although never fully applied, some of the ideas generated in
that debate were somewhat original even in an international context. This is particularly true for
the “soft budget constraint” problem in intergovernmental relationships. For this reason, in the
following we will also pay some attention to the Italian debate on fiscal federalism, reviewing
some of the most original ideas.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the reader with some
background information on the structure of the local governments in Italy. Sections 3 to 5 briefly
illustrate the development of local public finances in Italy. More  specificially, Section 3
illustrates the development of local public finances from mid-1970s to the beginning of the
1980s, focusing on the financial crises of the municipalities and the subsequent bailout by the
central government. Section 4 discusses the period from 1980 to the beginning of the 1990s,
mainly focusing on ordinary regions and health financing. Section 5 reviews the period from
1990 on, commenting on the reforms. Section 6 briefly reviews the Italian debate on fiscal
federalism of the mid-1990s. Section 7 sums up by discussing what can be learned from the
Italian experience and by suggesting avenues for further research.
Before beginning, a word of caution is in order. In what follows, we will not attempt to
review in detail all the developments in Italian local public finance in the last 25 years. This
would be too space and time-consuming, in addition to being overly boring to both the writer and
the reader. Rather, we will focus only on some relevant episodes that illustrate the main theme of
this paper, relegating all the remaining developments of the period to the background. At this
point, I would like to refer the interested reader to other sources for more extensive coverage.
Unfortunately, literature in English on the Italian local system of government is rare and often
out of date. A good recent discussion is in Emiliani et al. (1997), who cover some of the features
of the Italian local public finance not discussed here and present a richer set of data; Levaggi
(1996) discusses in some more detail the transfer systems among municipalities. Although a bit
out of date, the works of Fraschini and Osculati (1991) on municipalities and Buglione and
France (1983) on regions also offer useful introductions to the Italian system of local
government.9
2.  Italian Local Government: Background Information
There are four levels of government in Italy: central, regional, provincial and municipal. Local
governments consist of 20 regions, around 100 provinces, and more than 8,300 municipalities. In
theory, higher levels of governments have a role in supervising and coordinating the behavior of
lower level of governments in the same territory. In practice, though, there is no hierarchical
relationship between these different levels of government. Each local government is basically
autonomous in pursuing its policies and, in particular, there are very few financial links between
the different levels of sub-national governments.
5 On the contrary, each local government has a
direct financial link with the central government, which at least partly finances current and
capital expenditures with grants.
6 Among the  subnational governments, municipalities and
provinces have been a part of the structure of the Italian  state since its unification in the
nineteenth century.
7 Regions, on the other hand, were introduced only with the 1948
Constitution. Furthermore, 15 of these, called the Ordinary Statute Regions, were formally
established in 1970 and became fully operative only in 1978, when the National Health System
was established and regions were given responsibility for health care, as set forth in the 1948
Constitution (see below).
Municipalities and provinces are administrative bodies. Municipalities, by far the most
important of the two, are in charge of managing services such as local police, public hygiene,
social welfare, solid waste collection, street cleaning, urban planning, urban public
transportation, street maintenance, zoning and regulation of trade, supply of gas and electricity,
parks and sports facilities, and the provision and maintenance of buildings for primary and
secondary education. Provinces have residual responsibilities for non-solid waste collection,
maintenance of provincial highways, mountain transportation and air and water pollution
                                                          
5 These are mainly due to some functions which have been transferred by regions to municipalities in the past (such
as, for example, labor training and housing) and which are still financed with grants coming from the regional
budget. In the near future these regional grants to municipalities and provinces should to some extent increase as an
effect of the 1997 tax reform and the 1997 “decentralization laws.” See below.
6 This is not true only for some “special” regions that directly finance all their functions, with no extra money
coming from the central government budget. See below.
7 The main functions of municipalities and provinces were established in a comprehensive law in 1934; subsequent
important revisions occurred in 1977,1990, and in 1998 with the approval of the implementing laws relative to the
two “decentralization laws” of 1997 (the so-called Bassanini laws).10
control.
8 Municipalities and provinces differ greatly in terms of both the size of the population
and of the territory. Municipalities, in particular, range from very small towns of a few hundreds
of inhabitants to big cities with millions of citizens. Despite this, they are all attributed the same
functions by law. A well known result is that most municipalities are too small in size to capture
the increasing returns to scale in the provision of local public goods and services, resulting in
per-capita public spending which on average is considerably larger than those of larger
municipalities.
9 In spite of a long history of urbanization, it is worth recalling that approximately
50% of the Italian population lives in towns with less than 30,000 inhabitants, so that the loss of
efficiency induced by suboptimal size is likely to be considerable.  The present borders of cities
derive mainly from historical considerations; in spite of some attempts of fostering mergers of
smaller towns by the central government, the number of municipalities in Italy has actually
slightly increased since the second world war, contrary to the common tendency in most
developed countries (e.g., Bailey, 1997).
Italian regions belong to two different groups:  special (statute) regions  and  ordinary
(statute) regions. Special regions were established immediately after the war.
10 Their statutes,
which in some cases (e.g., Sicily) were issued even before the same 1948 Constitution, have the
rank of constitutional laws. Each special region is a world apart from the other special regions.
Each has a different assignment of resources and functions, depending on its statute and the
approved implementing laws (Cerea et al., 1989), but there are some common features. First,
they have generally been attributed more functions than ordinary regions.
11 Second, their primary
source of revenue is shared national taxes. Which national taxes are shared, and to what extent,
depends on the statute of each special region. The five special regions are either large islands
(Sicily and Sardinia) or small regions close to the national borders with a high percentage of
foreign population (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige,  Friuli Venezia Giulia). The larger
                                                          
8 This list is only partial, indicating the main functions attributed to the two levels of government. Again, it should
be noted that because of the two 1997 decentralization laws these functions might be considerably augmented in the
near future.
9 Empirical estimates of per capita expenditures as a function of population size usually show a U-shape, with per
capita public expenditure being higher at the two extremes, and the least cost size being in the range between 50,000
to 100,000 inhabitants (see for instance, Ambrosanio et al., 1999). Of course, these simple estimations do not
consider the fact that big cities also carry the weight of providing services to commuters.
10 Except Friuli-Venezia Giulia, which was established in 1964.
11 For instance, four special regions of the total of five are directly in charge of paying transfers to municipalities;
two directly finance primary and secondary education, two finance disability pensions, and so on. Furthermore,
since 1996 Trentino alto Adige, Val d’Aosta and Friuli Venezia Giulia are completely in charge of financing their
health sectors.11
autonomy and resources given to these regions were mainly meant to prevent the threat of
separatist movements and ethnic conflicts. A common judgement in Italy is that because of their
financing system, which directly links special regions’ resources to central government tax
revenue,
12 citizens in the special regions have been treated overly generously by the Italian state,
receiving more resources than necessary to finance their extra functions (Maggi and Piperno,
1992).
13  Notice that special regions are legislative bodies; in the range of their competencies,
they can issue laws regulating their own territories and decide which functions to implement.
Ordinary regions are also legislative bodies; however, they can issue laws only in the
framework of what is established by national laws. The delay in establishing these regions, more
than twenty years after the Constitution was drafted, was probably due to political reasons. The
ruling party of post-War Italy (the Christian Democrats) was afraid to lose power by delegating
resources to local governments which could be more easily controlled by the opposition party
(i.e., the Communist Party). Indeed, regions were established only in the seventies, after the
electoral success of the opposing parties, and made operative only in the period when the
Communist Party was giving external support to the government coalition. The political
willingness to keep regions under strict central control may partly explain the decision taken
concerning the financing of these regions, as will be discussed below.
The functions of ordinary regions were laid out in the Constitution and implemented by
regional laws.
14 Ordinary regions are responsible—whether directly or indirectly through local
production units such as the Local Health Units (since 1993, Local Health Firms)—for most
expenditures on health, transportation, welfare, agriculture, environment, tourism, public housing
and vocational training. The Constitution was less precise in defining the resources to be given to
                                                          
12 It is maybe worth recalling that tax revenue in Italy, as a percentage of GDP, rose from 26% in 1980 to 43% in
1992. As a result, special regions saw in the period a huge increase in their resources without bearing any political
responsibility for that increase and with a limited increase in their functions. See next note.
13 Just to give an idea, Trentino Alto Adige receives 90% of all state revenue collected in its territory and Sicily the
totality. As a result, in 1994, citizens in Val d’Aosta, received 12 million lire per capita and citizens in Trentino Alto
Adige 9 million per capita, whereas citizens in ordinary regions on average received less than 2 million lira. Even
taking into account that these regions perform extra functions, and computing the relative extra costs, this seems to
be an overly generous treatment by any account (see Cerea et al., 1989 for some estimations of the extra costs
incurred by the special regions). It should also be noted that for a long time the Italian state also gave to these
regions grants for financing expenditure in selected sectors, such as the health sector. These have been eliminated
only recently for some of them. In the Italian debate on fiscal federalis, changing the financing system of special
regions has often been proposed, making it more like the financing of ordinary regions. The problem is that the
financing system of special regions is defined in their statute and this statute has Constitutional value. Indeed, it is
commonly acknowledged that it is more difficult to change these statutes than the Constitution itself, as there are no
defined procedures for doing so.12
these regions, addressing generally of shared national taxes, own taxes and grants from the
central government. As a result, as discussed below, the central government chose for a long
period to finance these local governments almost exclusively through conditional and
unconditional grants.
Ordinary regions vary greatly in terms of population and territory. The largest region,
Lombardia, with almost 9 millions inhabitants, is in terms of size a state of its own, larger than
Austria. The smallest region, Molise, with slightly more than 300,000 inhabitants, is smaller than
many Italian cities. Irrespective of size, all ordinary regions are assigned the same tasks by law.
Again, as for municipalities, this implies that many Italian regions are clearly below the optimal
size, whatever that may be.
15
Italian regions do not differ only in size, however. The most important distinction is in
terms of the part of the country in which they are located. As is well known, the Center-North of
Italy is, by all standards, much more developed than the South. This reflects itself not only in
higher resources being available for the Northern regions
16 but also in a better social climate and
in a tradition of better administrative government. This partly explains why, with approximately
the same resources, ordinary regions of the Center-North have generally been able to offer better
services to their citizens. It also explains the great emphasis put by Italian politicians on the
redistributive role of the public sector on the territories. We will see shortly how important this
element was in determining local government financing in Italy.
We discuss expenditure and revenue assignments to the most important local
governments, municipalities and ordinary regions in more detail in the next sections. A few
quantitative indicators may, however, be useful in setting the stage for the discussion. Table 1
reports total revenues and expenditures for all levels of governments in selected years. It shows
that  subnational governments are responsible for more than 25% of all total expenditures
(including Social Security), and their expenditures are around a third of central government
                                                                                                                                                                                          
14 They are also under redesign because of the decentralization laws.
15 Bordignon and Emiliani (1997), for instance, estimate the per capita administrative cost of regions as a function of
population. Upon controlling for other variables, it turns out that elasticity of these costs with respect of population
is           -44%, implying that increasing the population of ordinary regions by one million inhabitants on average
reduces administrative cost per capita by 45,000 (1996) lira
16 To quote only one figure, GDP per capita in the richest region, Lombardia, is more than twice that of the poorest
region, Calabria. Worse than that, the gap between Northern and Southern regions, remarkably stable in the 1980s,
has been on the rise in recent times. Furthermore GDP per capita may not be a good measure of the different
resources potentially available to the North and South. As we discuss below (see Section 6), the tax base of the
newly introduced regional tax (IRAP) is distributed even more unevenly than GDP on the national territory.13
spending (excluding Social Security). Netting out intergovernmental transfers (the figures in
brackets),  subnational governments spend approximately half as much as the central
government—the latter figure includes interest payments, so that in terms of primary spending
this ratio is even higher. They are, therefore, a very important part of the total government. Local
expenditures were
17 on average around 14% of GDP, a figure which rather closely matches the
corresponding figures for other developed countries (see Bailey, 1997). However, local
government own revenues (the figures in brackets) were on average below 3% of GDP, a number
by far lower than the corresponding figures in other countries. This is clear evidence of the
mismatch between own revenue and expenditure referred to in the introduction. Indeed, in terms
of tax revenues, in the 1980s Italy was probably one of the most centralized countries in the
world.
Table 1. Revenue and Expenditure by Different Levels of Government (% of GDP)
  General Gov.






1980 33.6 42.2 23.5 (20.3) 30.8 (18.2) 11.7 (1.9) 12.8 (11.3)
1985 38.6 51.2 28.8 (24.0) 41.4 (24.0) 14.0 (2.3) 14.1 (14.0)
1990 42.5 53.4 31.0 (26.5) 40.9 (25.4) 13.2 (2.9) 14.6 (14.5)
1993 45.0 57.6 43.1 (29.9) 43.1 (29.0) 13.6 (4.2) 14.1 (14.0)
Source: ISTAT 1) Including social security contributions and payments. 2) In brackets the figures net of
transfers from or to the other levels of governments; without brackets, the same figures gross of transfers.
Table 2 distinguishes total expenditures and revenues for the different types of local
governments for the most recent year for which I could find comparable data for all local
governments. The table illustrates the relative importance of the different types of government.
Ordinary regions spend approximately half of all local governments put together, while
provinces cover a much smaller part of public expenditures. The table also illustrates the
mismatch between own revenues and expenditures for each type of local government. Clearly,
the vertical imbalance was much more pronounced for both ordinary and special regions than for
other levels of government. Indeed, in 1992, own revenues of regions covered only 3% of their
                                                          
17And it is still. The decentralization laws of 1997 have not yet been implemented, so it is not clear what will be the
increase in the expenditure allocated to sub-national governments. Preliminary estimates (Zanardi and Arachi, 1998)
quantify these new functions in a range between 20,000 to 30,000 billion lira, that is between 1-2% of GDP.14
total current revenue. We will see how things changed in the 1990s. We now discuss the story
behind these figures.






Total revenues 6.9 2.4 0.6 5.5
Current revenues 6.1 2.2 0.6 4.4
Of which
 Transfers
5.9 2.2 0.4 2.6
Total Expenditures 7.0 2.9 0.7 5.7
Current expenditures 6.0 1.8 0.5 4.0
Source: Italian Ministry of Budget
3.  The Tax Reform of the 1970s and the Financial Crisis of Municipalities
A useful starting point for discussing the evolution of local public finances in Italy is the tax
reform of the 1970s.  In 1972-73, a massive tax reform was introduced with the aim of
rationalizing and  modernizing the tax system, which was unanimously considered to be
inefficient, inequitable, and, in comparison to those of the other European countries, unable to
generate enough revenue to finance highly needed expenditures, especially on capital goods and
infrastructure. Several taxes, mostly real taxes and indirect specific taxes inherited from the past,
were repealed and new ad-valorem and personal taxes were introduced. These included Irpef, the
tax on personal incomes, Irpeg, the tax on corporate income, and Iva, the new VAT required by
the EEC. Tax administration and enforcement, previously partly attributed to local governments,
were totally  centralized, and a new system of enforcement, based on automatic accounting
procedures, was introduced (see Bordignon and Zanardi, 1997).
Concerning municipalities, old local taxes, such as the family tax and some sales taxes,
for which municipalities had previously had the right to choose the tax rate and define the tax
base, were eliminated. Others, such as IGE, where municipalities shared revenues, were
substituted by IVA, which did not allow for any revenue sharing at the local level. The reform
also introduced some new local taxes (Invim, Tarsu, Tosap, etc.)—basically taxes on the capital
gains on housing assets (Invim), on waste collection (Tarsu) and on the use of urban territory15
(Tosap)—but these proved immediately to be highly inelastic to income, and their real revenue
easily eroded by inflation. The reform also introduced a new tax on all incomes other than
dependent labor income, Ilor, (literally, the Local Tax on Incomes) which was supposed to serve
the double role of inducing some qualitative income discrimination in the fiscal system, and of
financing local governments. However, this tax never served its role; first, half of its base was
eliminated by a ruling of the Constitutional Court, which removed self-employed income from
its tax base, revenue subsequently claimed in its entirety by the central government.
The effects of these choices on the fiscal autonomy of municipalities were devastating.
Until 1972, own tax revenues covered about 50 percent of the total current revenues of
municipalities; by 1978 this figure had dropped to less than 10 percent. Correspondingly, grants
from the central government rose from less than 30 percent of total current revenues in 1972 to
almost 80 percent in 1978 (see Fraschini, 1980).
18
As is apparent from the documents of the period, the elimination of all municipal fiscal
autonomy was a deliberate political choice at the time. To understand why, it must be recalled
that, in the mid-1970s, Italy was going through severe social and economic crises. Because of the
oil shock of 1973, economic growth had halved and inflation was soaring (it remained at two
digits for more than a decade). Social unrest, including terrorism, was widespread. In this
situation, which also led the ruling parties to bring the Communist party closer to the
government,  centralizing all tax revenues was thought to be an avenue for keeping social
cohesion in the country. The program was as follows. Local taxes would be substituted by a
system of transfers aimed at  equalizing the expenditure capacity of all municipalities, thus
eliminating differences in local public expenditures due to different resource endowments. This
was thought to be highly desirable, especially given the enormous differences between the North
and the South. Grants and transfers to local governments would be based on a vast array of
“objective” parameters, eliminating any possible inequity in the distribution of resources.
Furthermore, financing local governments only through transfers would give the center better
control over both the growth and the composition of local expenditures, thus achieving sound
                                                          
18 One may wonder why local governments did not oppose to such a dramatic cut in their revenue-raising activities.
According to Fraschini and Osculati (1991, p. 224) “[The reform]...was favourably received: mainly because it
lightened the administrative and political responsibilities of the local authority regarding the management of the old
taxes. Moreover, the new system was only supposed to be temporary and, in addition, appeared to guarantee for the
immediate future a growth in real terms in revenue, and therefore in spending capacity.” On the latter point, as
explained below in the text , local governments turned out to be dramatically wrong.16
public finances and stimulating expenditures in those sectors where it was thought necessary to
do so. The residual autonomy of municipalities, if any, would be in selecting public expenditures
for that part not determined by the central policy maker.
To use a euphemism, the results of the centralization of the mid-1970s did not live up to
expectations.  As discussed in a number of empirical and theoretical studies  centered on the
financial crisis of Italian local governments of the 1970s (for instance, Brosio et al., 1980; Rizzo,
1985; Brosio, 1985), by eliminating all fiscal autonomy at the local level, the center also
eliminated all perceptions of the costs of increasing expenditures at the local level, thus enticing
local politicians to increase, or at least to accommodate, demands for higher services and higher
salaries. As a result, current terms expenditures of municipalities rose by an average 20 percent
each year between 1970 and 1977 (around six percent in real terms).
19 Current revenues,
composed of quickly falling own tax revenues and increasing transfers, did not rise fast enough
to keep pace with the soaring expenditures. In percentage of GDP, while cities’ current
expenditures remained roughly constant during the period, current revenues actually dropped by
more than 20%. As a result, current deficits soared, moving from less than 765 billion lira in
1970 to 4,200 billion lira in 1977. Debt service and interests payments also soared, increasing by
more than six percent in real terms each year from 1970 to 1976.
Confronted with increasing current expenditures and falling revenues, local governments
reacted by cutting capital spending (investment in public works dropped by more than 30 percent
of GDP during the period) and by financing the current deficit through borrowing from
commercial banks. This was possible under Italian legislation that, prior to 1975, did not impose
any restrictions on borrowing by local governments. By the end of 1977, the total stock of
external debt of municipalities had reached 13,000 billion lira, more than three times as much as
at the beginning of the period.
20 Coupled with nominal interest rates above 20%, many
municipalities quickly found themselves unable to finance interest and debt service. For many
cities, bankruptcy was imminent.
In this situation, the central government had no choice than to step in and rescue them. In
1977, emergency measures (the two “Stammati decrees”) were passed, imposing ceilings on the
rate of growth of local expenditures, restrictions on borrowing, and increasing transfers. In 1978,
                                                          
19 The figures quoted in this page are taken by Fraschini (1980).
20 The situation was not different for provinces, which had followed the same destiny of municipalities. See the
account in Fraschini (1980).17
when the two decrees became law, the central government assumed direct responsibility for the
debt accumulated by the municipalities prior to 1977, including interest and principal. At the
same time, central government transfers to local governments were increased by almost 300
percent from 3,700 billion lira in 1977 to 9,400 billion lira in 1978. As a result, the financial
situation of the municipalities was quickly reversed. From a current deficit of 4,200 billions of
lira in 1977, municipalities moved to a current surplus of almost 840 billion lira in 1978.
Furthermore, because the central government was now paying the interest for most of the debt
accumulated thus far, interest payment and debt service of municipalities were cut in half. In
exchange for the financial help, the central government imposed strict limits on the rate of
growth of local public expenditures (for instance, by not allowing new hiring in the local
governments) and made borrowings for local governments more difficult. After 1978, borrowing
to finance current expenditures was strictly prohibited (except for temporary liquidity shortages)
and a balanced budget requirement, including grants, was imposed. These measures proved to be
effective. The growth of municipal expenditures was kept under control in the subsequent years
and the debt
21 incurred by local governments remained approximately constant at about 10
percent of GDP during the 1980s.
Thus, the financial crisis of municipalities of the 1970s was quickly overcome. Its effects,
however, were  long-lasting. On the one hand, municipalities had learned that the central
government would step in and rescue them in case of an imminent failure. The resulting moral
hazard problem reduced fiscal responsibility at the local level. In order to keep local
expenditures and deficits at bay, the central government had to impose ceilings and other
mandatory measures on local expenditures in all the subsequent years. Fiscal irresponsibility was
aggravated, though, by reduced fiscal autonomy. The ratio of own revenues to total revenues of
municipalities remained below 30 percent during the 1980s and started to rise again only after
the reforms of the 1990s (see below). On the other hand, the policies of strict central control over
local public expenditures did not harden the budget constraint; they simply moved the problem
from the bailout of debts and deficits to the determination of grants. In order to “save” them
financially, the central government had simply increased the transfer to each municipality so as
                                                          
21 This is mainly the debt with the Deposit and Loan Fund, a public agency from which municipalities can draw
resources to finance capital expenditure.18
to approximately balance their budget. But, by doing so, it had implicitly given a premium to
municipalities that had been less fiscally responsible.
To understand the seriousness of this problem, the next table (again drawn from
Fraschini, 1980) reports the municipal debts for current and capital expenditures and by
territorial areas. Two elements are of interest. First, the debt was much higher in absolute value
in the South than in the North. This reflects the fact that municipalities in the South are much
poorer than in the North, and that the financial crisis of the 1970s hit them much more severely
than cities in the North. Second, the composition of the debt was very different in the North than
in the South. Even in the middle of the financial crisis, in 1975, municipalities in Northwest Italy
used almost 80 percent of their borrowing to finance public investments. In the South, 90 percent
of the funds borrowed went to finance current expenditures. This in itself, of course, does not
prove that municipalities in the South were less fiscally responsible than municipalities of the
North. It could be that cities in the South, being poorer, simply had to use all their borrowing just
to finance current expenditures, sacrificing all public investment. It does prove, however, that
indiscriminate financing of local government deficits through increased grants made the central
government cover up a lot of waste and reward the more inefficient municipalities.
Table 3. Debt for Current and Capital Expenditure and for Territorial Areas, (per capita) lira
Debt for current expenditures
   (1)
(1)/(3)
%
Debt for capital expenditures






1970 19,206 16.2 99,730 83.9 118,930
1975 48,441 21.7 174,550 78.3 222,950
North-east and central Italy
1970 84,541 53.7 72,890 46.3 157,430
1975 213,055 62.9 125,480 37.1 338,530
South Italy and Islands
1970 134,058 84.0 25,630 16.1 159,690
1975 321,655 89.3 38,360 10.7 359,640
Source: Fraschini (1980)
Since 1978, the central government has attempted to change the grant system several
times by gradually moving from a system which mainly finances past expenditures of
municipalities to a more rational one based on “objective” parameters capturing differences in19
needs and costs across municipalities. It never succeeded in doing so. According to Emiliani
(1997), more than 50 percent of the transfers paid to local governments in 1993 still depended on
the debt accumulated in the 1970s. There were two basic reasons for this. First, accounting and
budget procedures of local governments in Italy are not developed enough to allow for a serious
analysis of costs and expenditures at the local level, and little is known about the true tax base
for a number of local taxes. Thus, estimating reliable demand and cost functions turns out to be
particularly difficult. Attempts to do that made, e.g., by a government commission in 1993 and
1995 (Ambrosanio  et. al., 1999) were far from satisfactory, and  this was known by all
participants, including the municipalities.
22
Second, and more importantly, the central government lacked the political will to impose
a change in the transfer system. For example, a new law was passed in 1994 which was supposed
to progressively reduce (over 16 years!) the role of past expenditures in the determination of
transfers in  favor of “objective” parameters computed by the commission mentioned above.
However, the new model was applied only in 1994, to be abandoned in 1995. In 1996, a new law
was passed proposing a new model of determination of transfers; this law was never applied.
This lack of commitment on the part of the central government can be attributed to two
factors: the characteristics of the Italian political system on the one hand, and, especially in the
1990s, the public finance emergency on the other hand. As explained in the introduction, the
Italian political system produces ever-changing central governments, which typically do not feel
bound by decisions taken by previous governments.
23 As a result, governments have been
reluctant to write long-term contracts with local governments and have too often been willing to
renege on contracts once they had been signed.
As a result of all these failures, transfers to municipalities (and, in general, to all local
governments) in Italy are still decided annually on the basis of a bargaining process between
representatives of the municipalities and the central government. Basically, each government
receives what it received the previous year plus (or minus) an amount that depends on the
general situation of public finances and the relative bargaining strength of the two parts.
                                                          
22 One can always try, however, as it is difficult to image the results to be worse than those of the current system.
The present author, together with  Flavia  Ambrosanio and  Umberto  Galmarini, computed standard costs and
expenditures for municipalities in Lombardia (Ambrosanio et al., 1999). One of the two provinces of Trentino Alto
Adige, which is in charge of financing its own municipalities, also has developed a model to estimate standard costs
and expenditures for its municipalities.20
“Objective” indicators for implementing transfers to local governments are manipulated so as to
fit with the result of the bargaining. Clearly, the political affiliation and the political importance
of the participants (say, the mayor of a big city) may also affect the result of the bargaining.
It might be useful to note at this point that this way of setting the grants, in addition to
being clearly inefficient and inequitable, has two other negative consequences, which have
always been more serious for ordinary regions than for municipalities, as the ratio of transfers in
their revenues has always been higher (see next section). First, this approach introduces
uncertainty into local government budgeting. As transfers are decided annually, no local
government really knows at the time of setting its budget how much money it will receive from
the central government that year, let alone in years to come.  This makes budget management
and planning difficult, and it reduces the ability of local politicians to run their administrations
efficiently.
Second, the political strength of a mayor or a president of a region does not stem from the
ability to govern efficiently. Rather, it stems from having good relationships with central
government politicians and public officials, as these relationships may result in receiving more
grants. Thus the Italian grant system induces a distortion in local government, diverting scarce
resources from managerial effort to lobbying. By the same token, it also tends to produce a
political class that is better at lobbying than management.
24
We end this section by noting another characteristic of the Italian system of local
government that works against efficient management at the local level. This is the large overlap
of functions between different levels of government, which reduces the accountability of local
politicians and induces local governments to free-ride on each other. As explained in the next
section, this problem is rampant, especially in health management. For municipalities and
provinces, a simple example illustrates the point. In the education sector, the central government
is in charge of financing teachers’ salaries and equipment and local authorities finance outlays
for building maintenance. Financing of the support staff is divided between the municipalities
which pay the salaries of the nonteaching personnel in kindergartens and scientific high schools,
                                                                                                                                                                                          
23 The average life of an Italian government in post-war Italy was about 10 months. Following the electoral reform
of 1993, however, the average life has slightly increased.
24 On these grounds, the Italian experience certainly offers support to the political economy literature which, in the
presence of centralized revenue and decentralized expenditure (the “common pool” problem), argue in favor of
modelling local governments as “pressure groups”: see for instance Persson and Tabellini (1994). See Section 7 for
further comments.21
the provinces which are in charge of the nonteaching personnel in technical high schools, and the
central government which finances the salaries of the nonteaching personnel in classical and
professional high schools. Finally, the administrative staff in kindergartens and scientific high
schools is paid by the central government, which also pays the staff in the junior schools.
No one really knows or recalls any longer why the assignments to the different levels of
governments were chosen in this way. The result, however, is an administrative nightmare,
inefficient management of the work force and a loss of accountability of the governments
involved in the sector.
25
4.  The 1980s and the Financial Problems in Ordinary Regions
We now turn to the other main actor in the Italian local government system: the ordinary
regions.
26  Introduced in the 1970s, they became an important part of the Italian system of
government only in the 1980s, when they assumed their full responsibilities. Much of what we
have already said for the municipalities could be repeated for ordinary regions, except that,
especially in the 1980s, their situation was decidedly worse than that of municipalities. Lack of
fiscal autonomy, fiscal irresponsibility, lack of accountability and transparency, overlapping
competencies and the perception of soft budget constraints affected this level of government in a
way that was unknown to the other local authorities. Bailouts by the central government, rather
than being relegated to a single episode as in the case of municipalities, were a common practice
in financing for this level of government.
We begin by describing the assignment of expenditures and resources to these regions.
27.
In 1992, the year before the first reform of the 1990s, ordinary regions spent 71.1 percent of their
total resources on health services, 6.1 percent on transportation, 10.4 percent on economic
services (mainly agriculture), 3.1 percent on education and culture, 1.3 percent on housing and
                                                          
25 Some of the consequences of this state of affairs may be almost comical. For instance, in the research mentioned
above,  Ambrosanio  et al. (1999) found no correlation whatsoever between the amount of expenditure and the
number of staff employed in the education sector by municipalities and other indicators such as the number of
schools or the number of students. Whether this was due to slack, mistakes in the accounting procedural of
municipalities, or failures in the data set is not known.
26 As discussed above, the situation of special regions was totally different. Because of the relative abundance of
resources, however, they had in general a better life, and, especially in the case of the three small regions of the
North, they are generally regarded as local governments with a tradition of high efficiency in the supply of services.
Islands, though, are in a much worse state and, especially in the case of Sicily, a terrifying story of inefficiency and
criminality could be told.  However, this story will have to wait for another occasion.
27 The source of the following data is the Ministry of the Budget.22
4.5 percent on general services. Interest payments were only 0.5 percent of total expenditures, all
of which were used to finance capital expenditure.
28 On the revenue side, 2.7 percent came from
own taxes, largely surcharges on small central government excises on consumption and
production,
29 and 96.8 percent from grants and transfers (96 percent from the central government
alone). Of the transfers from the central government, less than four percent came as
unconditional grants
30 and the rest as conditional grants. Among the latter, the most important
were the National Health Fund, a fund earmarked for health expenditures, and the National
Transportation Fund, earmarked for transportation. In addition, there were dozens of smaller
earmarked funds, most of them designated for financing agriculture, forestry and other economic
services.
As in the case of municipalities, a deliberate choice had been made by the central
government to keep the fiscal autonomy of the ordinary regions at the lowest possible level. The
constitutional ambiguity regarding the financing of these regions was used to inflate the role of
grants relative to own taxes and shared revenues. Conditional grants predetermined not only the
type of expenditure, but also many other details, as regions were often given very strict
guidelines by the central government on how to spend the money, leaving them very little room
to express their legislative powers. For example, in the case of health services,
31 the Ministry of
Health determined in minute detail how resources from the National Health Fund (NHF) should
be employed (for instance, the share of current and capital expenditure, the amount going to
finance hospitals rather than paying general practitioners, etc.), and the parameters determining
the supply of services in the regions (e.g., the number of hospital beds or of general practitioners
for 1,000 inhabitants). Furthermore, most of the elements affecting health expenditures were
directly determined by the central government itself (say, ticket rates on drugs, wages and
                                                          
28 Regions can borrow only to finance capital expenditure, and there are strict rules (basically sound finances)
concerning both the size (no more than 25% of current surplus) and the conditions under which debt can be raised.
29 According to the Italian accounting definition of own taxes, a local government is said to have an own tax as long
as it has at least some latitude in modifying the tax rate.
30 They were the Common Fund and the Regional Development Projects Fund. Both of them were distributed
following a strongly distributive rule. For instance Calabria, the poorest region, typically received from the funds 2.5
times as much as Lombardia, the richest region. In theory, the Common Fund should have been financed with a
given percentage of the revenue from excise taxation (the mineral oil tax) to enact the Constitutional principle of
sharing tax revenue. In practice, as any other transfers to local government, its size was determined yearly as the
result of a bargaining between the central government and the regions; see below in the text.
31 In Italy, health services are mainly provided by the public sector either directly through public hospitals or
indirectly, by financing with public money, approved private hospitals and suppliers. The private health sector is23
salaries of health workers, rates for private suppliers, etc.). According to some estimates
(Bordignon and Volpi, 1995), the share of the total budget that was really left at the disposal of
the regional authorities was less than four percent.
Regional politicians and managers were, therefore, not accountable to the citizens of their
regions; basically, they had no choices to make except those of following central government
rules. However, in a sense, they were not accountable to the central government, either. They
could be held accountable only if they failed to comply with the formal rules defining the
allocation of grants. But there were no substantial controls, if only because poor accounting
procedures in the public sector made such controls extremely difficult. Similarly, on the revenue
side, regional taxes, being mostly surcharges on state taxes, were difficult to manipulate and
were totally invisible to the taxpayer.
Two arguments were used to support this extreme centralization of powers, which was
certainly in conflict with the spirit if not the letter of the 1948 Constitution. First, the central
determination of expenditures was thought to facilitate control over the growth and distribution
of regional public expenditures. This also explains the decision, taken in 1982, to avoid any
automatic determination of grants.
32  The size of the conditional and unconditional funds—
together with all grants and transfers made to all the other local governments—were to be
determined yearly by the central government at the time of presenting the budget law, depending
on available resources and on the policies pursued by the central policymaker.
Second, entrusting all resources to the centre and financing local governments via grants,
was thought to enable the central government to reach higher levels of redistribution across the
country. In the case of ordinary regions, this was (and still is) felt particularly necessary as health
services are concerned. A sentence in the Constitution was read as implying that access to the
same health services was a constitutionally guaranteed right of all Italian citizens. As health
services are assigned to the regions by the Constitution, the perceived implication was that each
region should provide exactly the same services in exactly the same way, imposing the same
prices and charges to all citizens. As costs and needs differ across the country, the constitutional
rule might well have been regarded as compatible with different resources being assigned to
                                                                                                                                                                                          
rather small. The Italian National Health System (SSN) was introduced in 1978, basically copying the characteristics
of the British NHS. See France (1996) for a recent account of the SSN and a comparison with the NHS.
32 From 1978 to 1981, grants to the National Health Fund were based according to a National Health Plan set up by
the Ministry of Health.24
different ordinary regions. In practice, however, estimating local cost functions and the quality of
services was difficult due to the lack of reliable data and accounting procedures. Therefore, the
pursuit of uniformity in the provision of health services became a pursuit of uniformity in per
capita health expenditures.
In this respect at least, the central government was indeed successful. In spite of the large
differences in own resources among Italian regions, (ordinary) regional per capita expenditures
were (and still are) basically the same in all Italian regions. By far less successful was the central
government's effort to equalize the supply of services and to control the growth of regional
expenditures. To explain why, I will focus on health services. Much the same could be said for
the other sectors, in particular transportation (see, for instance, Emiliani et al., 1997).
First, in terms of the quality of services, Northern regions have performed consistently
better than their Southern counterparts. In spite of equalized resources per capita, the supply of
public health care facilities is considerably lower in the South than in the North. As a result, the
part of household demand for health care met by private suppliers and partly paid by the citizens
themselves has been consistently higher in the South than in the North.
Second, and more important for the aims of the present paper, the overlapping of
competencies in the health sector between the central government and the regions induced a
large degree of fiscal irresponsibility at the local level, resulting in consistent waste of resources
and in regional expenditure growth above the desired level. In a sense, the separation of
functions between the center’s financing the services and setting rules and guidelines and the
regions’ managing the services turned out to be the worst of all possible worlds. All attempts
made by the central government in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s to control the
growth of health expenditures by setting strict budget rules were ineffective, with actual
expenditures running consistently above planned expenditures. Regions refused to accept any
blame for this, always claiming that they were just applying state rules and not having enough
managerial room to promote resource saving in the sector. According to the regions, the blame
lay with the central government itself, which was consistently underfunding the National Health
Fund, forcing the Local Health Units (LHUs), the regional bodies in charge of producing and
managing the health services, to borrow to meet their financial needs. Irresponsibility at the
regional level was reinforced by the lack of credible penalties, such as bankruptcy procedures,
for regions. The result was a continuous bailout of LHU debts by the central government and a25
loss of the central government’s ability to program and control health expenditures—exactly the
opposite of what was hoped at the time the system was set up. In turn, health being an important
part of total government expenditures, this inability to control expenditures at the regional level
resulted in higher public deficits and debt accumulation at the central level.
The following table (taken from Degni and Emiliani, 1995) illustrates the development of
the National Health Fund in the period 1989-1993.
       Table 4. National Health Fund: Budgetary Appropriation and
                                    Deficits in Ordinary Region (in billions of lira)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Budget appropriation (1) 49,443 55,350 67,384 71,044 70,311
Deficit
(2)
6,235 13,688 9,880 5,316 5,545
Central Government loan (3) 4,784 9,859 8,795 5,316 ------
(2)/(1) 12.6 24.7 14.7 7.5 7.8
(3)/(1) 76.7 72.2 59,0 100,0 ----
                                     Source: Degni and Emiliani (1995).
The first line illustrates the budget appropriation to NHF for each year; the second line,
the deficit incurred in the health sector each year, that is, the difference between actual
expenditures and the resources assigned to the NHF. At the beginning of the period, effective
expenditures were 13 to 15 percent larger than planned. In 1990, effective expenditures were 25
percent larger than planned. The third line reports the  short term loans from the central
government to the regions to meet the increased expenditures. Notice also that the situation
seems to be improving at the end of the period, when the reforms of the 1990s began to take hold
(see the next section).
But how was it possible that, for more than a decade, the central government consistently
underestimated health expenditures to such an extent? To answer this question we have to
examine in greater detail the process of setting up the NHF and the  behavior of the actors
involved. The figures shown in the table are the result of a game being played between the
regions and the central government, a game whose rules were perfectly known to everybody,
except maybe to public opinion and to some representatives of international organizations. Every
year, at the time of setting the budget law, the central government determined both the size of the26
NHF and its distribution across the regions. The NHF was partially funded by the revenues from
two earmarked taxes, a payroll tax on dependent workers and a health income tax on self-
employed workers.
33 . The central government decided how much additional money to put into
the NHF, thus effectively programming health expenditures for the next year. Both the size and
the distribution of the NHF across regions were the result of a bargaining between the regions
and the central government. The appropriation rules were more or less set so as to equalize per
capita health expenditures in each region, with some adjustments to account for health mobility
across regions,
34 needs indicators and the (political) bargaining power of the players involved. In
deciding the size of the NHF, the central government deliberately underfunded the NHF, making
it just slightly larger than the (planned) size of the previous year. The regions accepted this
underfunding because it was obvious to everybody that the budget thus set for health
expenditures was going to be “soft.”  Underfunding provided a short-term but substantial
(political) advantage to the central government, allowing it to present a better-looking national
budget, thus reducing the need for hardly popular reduction in public expenditures or increases in
the tax pressures. It did have, of course, longer-term disadvantages; but, because of the peculiar
characteristics of the Italian political system, the government taking the decision would most
probably not be there to take the blame when this happened.
Faced with insufficient resources to finance health expenditures, regions could not
borrow to meet their financial needs because of strict legal regulations on regions’ borrowing
(see note 28). However, the Local Health Units (LHU),
35, the regional bodies actually in charge
of producing and financing the health services, could borrow, and they did, through arrears to
suppliers and by borrowing from banks. In doing so, the LHU’s never faced any credit
constraints, despite their deteriorating financial situation, because it was again obvious to banks
and suppliers that sooner or later the central government would step in and take care of debts and
interest. As the process took time, however, private suppliers to LHU’s, expecting delayed
payment, generally overpriced their services. Eventually, and generally with one or two years’
                                                          
33 On average, the revenue from these health taxes never covered more then 50% of the total outlays in the sector.
Both taxes have been repealed by the 1997 reform and substituted with the Irap tax; see the next section.
34 Because of the lower quality and quantity of public health services available in the South, Italy is characterized by
high health mobility, with citizens of the South emigrating to the North to consume health services.
35 LHUs also charge user fees; however, the income generated by these fees never exceeded 3% of their total
expenditure.27
delay, the central government did step in, clearing debts and interests of the LHU’s by issuing
government bonds.
It should be noted that this immediately increased the stock of central government debt in
the year in which the bailout took place, yet without affecting the central government deficit in
that year. The effect on the national budget appeared only in subsequent years, when interest on
the increased debt was allocated to the national budget.
Thus, everybody was happy playing this game:
36 the central government, because it could
present better-looking, although slightly falsified, budget numbers; the regions and the LHU’s,
because they could offer health services without really having to make any efforts to reduce
waste and because they could blame the central government for the poor quality of services due
to a lack of resources; and the private suppliers of the LHU’s, because they could overprice
them. At least up to 1992, even the citizens seemed to be happy, too, because in exchange for
poor services and ever-increasing tax pressure and public debt, they could invest their savings in
public bonds paying high nominal and real interests rates.
37 Paradoxically, at the end of the
1980s, the high interests rates on public bonds resulting from the mismanagement of public
finance by the central government had in fact become one of the governing coalitions’ primary
means of maintaining political consensus. It was only with the financial crisis of 1992 and the
political earthquake produced by the “clean hands” judges that it became clear that the game
described above, and similar games being played throughout Italian society, could not go on.
5.  The Reforms of the 1990s: Attempts at Decentralization
The turning point in the Italian story of public finance occurred in 1992 (Monorchio, 1996), an
exceptional year in Italian history for two reasons. First, the country’s financial crisis culminated
in Italy’s falling out of the European Monetary System and the devaluation of the lira.
Subsequent accounts by the members of the ruling executive (Barucci, 1996) clearly show that
the Italian government of the time feared the financial bankruptcy of the country, resulting from
a refusal by private households and banks to hold government bonds. Repudiation of public debt
was a serious possibility. To avoid a financial crisis, the most ferocious fiscal contraction in post-
                                                          
36 The game is still going on, although to a less extent. Estimations of the actual total debt of the LHUs (now, Local
Health Firms) are at around 30,000 billion lira, and the actual government is preparing to cover it up in the next
budget law.28
war Italy was introduced. In 1992 alone, the fiscal contraction amounted to more than five
percent of GDP, resulting from increased taxes and cuts in public expenditures. Furthermore,
long-needed “structural reforms” were introduced to reform the health system, the pension
system and local government financing.
38 The reversal of the financial situation begun in 1992
was indeed successful; since 1993, the central government primary budget has presented large
and increasing surpluses. In 1997, the primary surplus was as large as six percent of GDP, and
the budget deficit dropped below three percent of GDP,
39 allowing Italy to meet the Maastricht
criteria and be admitted to the EMU in 1999.
Second, the disclosures by the “clean hands” judges in 1992, emphasized by the media,
quickly eroded the consensus of the parties which had continuously ruled the country since the
end of the Second World War.
40 At one point in 1993, more than 100 Italian MP’s were under
scrutiny for corruption by the judicial system. As a result, the Italian Parliament, which had
traditionally been very responsive to the pressures of well organized groups and very good in
blocking or delaying reforms which could jeopardize the power or the economic performance of
these groups, had no strength nor legitimacy left to oppose the decisions taken by the executive.
Together with the financial emergency, this explains why in 1992, in only three months,
important reforms that had been discussed in parliament for more than a decade were quickly
approved. These included important reforms of local government financing. In particular, the
central government’s attitude regarding local public finances changed dramatically. Rather than
attempting to control local expenditures by the  center, responsibility at the local level was
increased by reducing the role of transfers and by increasing the revenue and expenditure
autonomy of the local governments.
41
                                                                                                                                                                                          
37 It is worth recalling that in 1992 interest payments on public debt amounted to 12% of GDP and real interest rates
were around 6-7%.
38 It was also decided to freeze public and private wages, with a trilateral agreement reached in 1993 between the
central government, the trade unions and employers’ representatives. This probably saved the country as it prevented
the strong currency devaluation of the subsequent years from affecting the inflation rate.
39 It was over 10% of GDP in 1992.
40 Mainly the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party. Both parties would have been completely wiped
out by the political stage in the subsequent 1994 elections.
41 Not extraneous, naturally, to the central government’s changed attitude towards local governments was naturally
not extraneous the electoral success in the North of the country of the Lega, a territorial party which asked for more
decentralization in revenue and expenditure (“fiscal federalism,” in their interpretation of the word). For a brief
period, from 1994 to 1996, the  Lega was also a member of the governmental  coalition which ruled Italy.
Subsequently, however, it committed political suicide by isolating itself by the rest of the Parliament and by
radicalizing its political program (e.g., advocating secession of “Padania,” a fictitious region in the North of Italy
made up of some of the wealthiest Italian regions, such as Lombardia, Veneto, Piemonte, and part of  Emilia-29
For what concerns us here, the main reforms were as follows. In 1993, following the
reform of the health system, the two earmarked health taxes were attributed to the ordinary (and
special) regions. Furthermore, the central government reduced its responsibility for the financing
of health services to “guaranteed, nationally uniform” levels of health care services. Regions
were to “bear the financial consequences of supplying health care above this guaranteed uniform
level, of setting up health units and beds above the set standards, and for the deficit of Local
Health Units.” To help regions meet these requirements, extra resources and more fiscal
autonomy were given to them. In particular, regions were allowed to increase the rates of the
earmarked taxes to up to six percent, and actually were supposed to be under obligation to do so
if the Local Health Units were in deficit.
42 New unearmarked resources were given to the regions
in 1993, while transfers were cut by the same amount.
In 1995, the decentralization process took another important step forward. In that year, all
conditional and unconditional grants to ordinary regions, except those to the NHF, were
abolished by the central government. In exchange, the regions obtained a share of the revenue
from the national tax on gasoline consumed in their territory, and the right to increase, up to 30
lira per liter, the gasoline tax rate. To match the difference between the abolished grants and the
revenue from shared taxes, a new unconditional Redistribution Fund was established.
43 It was
supposed to disappear as soon as the new resources coming from the shared tax on gasoline had
reached the size of the abolished grants.
44 As the resources coming from the gasoline tax were
not earmarked, the regions saw a consistent increase in their free resources.
In 1997, another massive tax reform took place (see Bordignon et al., 1998). The two
earmarked health taxes were abolished together with Ilor, Iciap (a small municipality own tax
introduced in the 1980s) and a number of other taxes on corporation and local consumption, and
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Romagna). The lack of a serious political force at the national level supporting decentralization has much to do with
the current difficulties in pursuing the decentralization programme initiated in 1992. See below.
42 The financing of the health care units, both private and public, was also changed by moving from a
“retrospective” (cost-plus) system to a “prospective” (fixed price) one. In particular, public and private hospitals are
now financed according to the American DRG system. Furthermore, Local Health Units—renamed Local Health
Firms—and the main public hospitals were transformed to firms by adopting private sector accounting rules. In
particular, they can now run profits, and these profits can be used to increase remuneration of employees. In copying
with the logic of a  decentralized system, the determination of the DRG tariffs was attributed to the regions
themselves. For further details, see France (1996).
43 The name of the Fund derives from the way it was computed. Basically, the percentage of sharing of the national
gasoline tax was determined so as to guarantee exactly the same amount of resources of the abolished grants to the
richest region, Lombardia, which was therefore in equilibrium All other regions received transfers from the Fund, in
a percentage depending on the amount of the transfers abolished for those regions.30
replaced by a new “regional tax on all productive activities,” the Irap. Because of its very large
tax base (approximately half of the national GDP), the Irap is a massive tax.
45 In 1998, the first
year of its application, and with an average tax rate around 4.2 percent, its revenue was around
50,000 billion lira. Eventually, all Irap revenues should go to regions; currently, however, the
central government receives a part of it in compensation for some of the national taxes repealed
by the reform. 90 percent of the revenue from the Irap is earmarked for health; the rest is
allocated freely to the regions (net of a quota to be given to municipalities; see below). Starting
in 2000, the regions have some autonomy over the tax rate of Irap, allowing them to raise
(reduce) the rate in their territory by one percent. Furthermore, regions are also given a share in
the tax base of Irpef (the personal income tax); half a percent of the tax base of the income tax is
allocated to regions and earmarked to health. Again, as of 2000, regions have the opportunity to
increase their share in Irpef by increasing it by one percent.
Finally, in 1997 the two  decentralization framework taxes (known as “the Bassanini
laws”) were passed. These laws eliminated a number of formal controls by the central
government on regional behavior, and made an attempt to assign the regions and other local
authorities all those administrative functions that the Constitution does not explicitly assign to
the central government. The implementing laws were approved in 1998; but today it is still
unclear which specific functions will be attributed to the regions and what resources they will
have for them. It is also unclear how this devolution of resources will be financed—quite likely
by increasing the regions’ share of the tax base of Irpef and the gasoline tax and, maybe, by
giving the regions a share in the revenues from Iva collected in their territories.
Concerning municipalities and provinces, a main framework tax was passed in 1990,
which reduced the role of the central government in the direct financing of local governments to
a residual one limited to central functions attributed to municipalities. In 1993, Invim was
abolished and a new tax on housing wealth, Ici, was introduced. Municipalities were allowed to
choose the Ici tax rate in a given interval (between 0.4 to 0.7 percent). Progressively they have
been given more autonomy in determining tax deductions from Ici and in monitoring their Ici tax
base. Transfers to municipalities were reduced in 1993 by the same amount of the Ici revenue at
                                                                                                                                                                                          
44 Not the southern regions, however, which were going to receive the same resources in real terms forever.
45 Basically, the theoretical tax base of Irap is a measure of value added, net GDP at the cost of factors; i.e., the sum
of all wages, profits and rents (including interest payments) net of depreciation. In practice, a variety of special31
the minimum 4 percent rate, (net of Invim’s revenue in 1992). In 1997, in exchange for the
abolished Iciap, they received a sharing quota in the regional Irap. In 1999, municipalities
received 0.5 percent of the tax base of the income tax in their territory to finance the new
functions delegated by the central government with the Bassanini laws, with the possibility of
increasing this quota further up to 1%. Similar decisions were taken for provinces.
In order to increase accountability of local governments and to make them more
responsive to local preferences, new electoral laws were introduced for municipalities (1993) and
ordinary regions (1994),  which replaced the old, simple proportional rules. Under the new rules,
the role of the president of a region or a province and of the mayor of a major city has been
strengthened. In cities above 15,000 inhabitants, mayors are now elected through a two-ballot
mechanism, similar to the French general election mechanism. If no candidate receives more
than 50% of the votes under the first ballot, the two candidates receiving the greatest number of
votes go to the second ballot, where the candidate receiving more than 50% of the votes is
elected. Once elected, the list supporting the winner receives a majority premium assuring at
least 60% of the seats in the municipal council. A mayor cannot be substituted by her majority or
overthrown by the council; if she falls, new elections must be held. Similar majority premiums
have been introduced for regions, although, differently from the mayor,  a president can be
substituted by her council.
The new electoral rules have been effective in giving more powers especially to the
mayor, who cannot be betrayed or blackmailed by her majority any longer. They have also
increased the visibility of the mayor in the public. Indeed, at least in the large cities, the new
electoral rules created a new local political class largely independent of the national parties.
46
Casual evidence suggests that the new electoral rule, coupled with more budget autonomy and
larger flexibility in the use of resources, has been instrumental in reducing slack in the municipal
administration.
Summing up, quite a massive change in local public finance occurred in Italy in the
1990s. The change is best witnessed by the new ratio of transfers and own resources for all levels
of government. Thanks to Ici, average municipalities now finance more than 50 percent of their
                                                                                                                                                                                          
provisions (mainly in agriculture and in the banking sector) reduces this tax base somewhat.  Irap tax payments are
furthermore not deductible from other local or national taxes.32
total expenditures with own resources. This ratio stands at 65-70 percent for municipalities in the
North (Ambrosanio et al., 1999). There are, however, cities in the South where own resources
cover no more than 20-30 percent of total expenditures. After the reforms, ordinary regions
receive conditional transfers from the central government only to finance health expenditures (in
1998, approximately half of NHF was directly financed by regions through Irap; the rest came
from the central government); for the rest they are either self-financed or receive unconditional
money from sharing of national taxes or from the Redistribution Fund. Furthermore, the
decentralization laws have eliminated many formal  controls which effectively reduced the
legislative autonomy of regions in several sectors.
Does this mean that the 1990s reforms solved the problems of local public finance in
Italy, providing correct incentives to local governments and eliminating the soft budget
distortions of the past ? Not quite. Large distortions at the local level are still present, and there is
a very serious risk that a reversal of the decentralization process, both on the expenditure and
revenue side, might occur. Regarding municipalities, the situation has largely improved on the
revenue side, because of the new local taxes. However, the problems of overlapping of
competencies and suboptimal size indicated above still prevail at this level of government. Waste
and the lack of accountability still affect municipalities. Worse than that, the grants to
municipalities (and provinces) that remain in effect are still decided in the old ad hoc and
discretionary way based on past expenditures. As cities are more financially autonomous,
lobbying at the central level for higher grants is less important than it was in the past; however, it
still takes place. The resulting irrational system of transfers is even less tolerable today than in
the past, since increasing autonomy at the local level has also increased inequity in the
distribution of resources across the country. A more rational system of grant allocation is badly
needed for reasons of both for efficiency and equity.
Regarding the regions, the overlapping of functions illustrated above still largely affects
health expenditures. The problem is that, at the moment, ordinary regions do not do much other
than finance and regulate health expenditures; if anything, the ratio of health expenditure to the
total regional expenditure has increased further since 1992, reaching approximately 80% in 1997
                                                                                                                                                                                          
46 Indeed, in the 1999 European elections, a new Party (the “Democrats”), largely made up of the mayors of the
main Italian cities, ran for the seats in the European parliament, in competition with the original parties of which the
mayors had been members.33
(Bordignon and Emiliani, 1997).
47 Thus, distortions in health expenditures which result from
overlapping competencies and bailouts are likely to affect deeply the behavior of regions in other
sectors as well. On these grounds, it must be noted that the 1993 health reform did not succeed in
inducing fiscal responsibility at the regional level. Draconian measures in the health sector
48
passed by the central government at the beginning of the 1990s managed to keep the growth of
health expenditure under control in those years. However, health expenditures started increasing
immediately afterwards, resulting again in deficits in the current accounts of the LHUs (now
called Local Health Firms, LHF). In spite of the 1993 law, regions have refused to use their
increased fiscal autonomy to finance these deficits; despite the law, the room given to them to
increase the earmarked health tax rate has never been used. Quite clearly, the implied threat in
the 1993 health reform law was not credible; regions knew that by not raising their tax rates they
would eventually force the central government to give in and finance the deficits.
49 As a result,
LHF deficits were, and still are, financed ex post by the central government (see note 36). To
some extent, the game described in the previous section is still going on.
To put it differently, the overlapping competencies in the health sector produce a “double
moral hazard effect” (Bosi and Tabellini, 1996). Although provided with extra resources, regions
prefer to spend this extra money in sectors other than health services, leaving central government
with the obligation to cover the deficit in the health sector. The reasons are twofold. On the one
hand, because of the large overlapping of competencies, the perceived budget constraint is
certainly softer in the health sector than in other regional sectors. Regions are more certain that
the central government will eventually foot the bill for health spending rather than, say, spending
for agriculture or tourism. On the other hand, spending extra money in other sectors is politically
more rewarding for regional governments, because their citizens perceive these sectors as being
more directly under the control of the regions than health. Quite obviously, no regional
government feels like increasing the tax rate on its own constituency to provide better health
                                                          
47 Pending the effects of the decentralization laws, of course.
48 Mainly, a large increase in the rate of copayments by consumers to health services and a forced reduction in the
prices of pharmacological drugs.
49 This also suggests, in contrast with what is argued in some recent literature (i.e., Eichengreen and Von Hagen,
1996), that a reduction in the fiscal imbalance per se is not enough to make the budget of a local government “hard.”
As long as the expectations of bailing out are not erased by the system, the local government will simply refuse to
use its increased autonomy to cover its extra expenditure. See the concluding section for more comments on this
issue.34
services, when another level of government might be credited for these. The net result is a
stimulus to increase deficits and expenditures in both the health sector and in the other sectors.
Unfortunately, this situation seems to be irresolvable. On the one hand, the central
government (or at least the current ruling majority) does not seem to be willing for political
reasons to resolve the conflict of competencies by giving more autonomy to regions. On the
other hand, the Constitution does not allow the central government to entirely bypass the regions
in health management.
50
The situation has been further complicated by the central government’s choices regarding
the new resources allocated to the ordinary regions. In a country so economically divided as
Italy, the decision to base the new fiscal autonomy of regions on taxes on value added (Irap) and
income (the regional share to Irpef) was bound to be problematic. Income and value added are
much more inequitably distributed across the country than other potential regional tax bases such
as regional consumption. In 1998, the first year in which the new tax law was in force, per capita
revenues from Irap were equal to 1,364,800 lira in Lombardia, the richest region, compared to
only 383,300 lira in Calabria, the poorest region. For the “private” part of Irap,
51 the part for
which the regions have tax rate autonomy, the difference is even more remarkable: 1,208,700 lira
in Lombardia versus 180,400 lira in Calabria. With such differences, no further decentralization
of financial powers to the regions is possible or desirable without a decent and rational
redistribution system across Italian regions. This also explains why most of the Italian debate on
fiscal federalism focuses on the normative characteristics of such a system (see next section).
Not least because of the figures just illustrated, the decentralization process of the early
1990s seems to have stopped, and there are worrying signs of a reversal. The 1997
decentralization laws are taking much more time to be implemented than expected and might
eventually result in less devolution of functions than desired. A new health reform, just proposed
by the Ministry of Health, attempts to recentralize this sector. Furthermore, the pressing central
government finance situation of the late 1990s made the central government introduce new
                                                          
50 A recent decree, to be made law in 2000, foresees the removal of the central conditional grants to the health
sector, and their substitution with (unconditional) resources stemming from regional sharing of national taxes.
However, the Ministry of Health is strongly opposed to this solution, as it fears that the removal of a direct channel
of funding by the central state to regions may also undermine its authority over regional behavior. This fear may be
justified: see  Banting (1997) for a discussion of a similar conflict occurring in Canada, between the Federal
Government and the Provinces, as a result of the progressive reduction of the share of Health financing by the
Federal Government. As to how things will evolve in Italy in the future, it is hard to say at the moment.
51 The private part of Irap is value added in the private sector; the public part is basically the public employee wages.35
restrictions on local public expenditures. In 1995, regions and local governments were
responsible for pushing up the central government deficit by an unexpected 10,000-15,000
billion lira. The central government reacted by imposing cash controls on the funds regional and
local authorities can withdraw from their cash accounts with the Treasury.  In 1998, the
Maastricht Stability Pact was decentralized in the sense that local governments will have to pay
(in the form of reduced transfers and reduction in shared taxes) a portion, depending on their
own deficits, of any penalty imposed on Italy for violating the deficit limit of three percent of
GDP. Clearly, these policies reflect the difficulty of continuing the process of decentralization in
times of fiscal emergency and tight aggregate budget constraints.
A good opportunity for Italy to commit to the decentralization process was lost with the
failure of the Bicameral Commission in 1997, a political two-chambers body made of
representatives of all Italian parties, which was set up in 1996 to propose amendments to the
Italian Constitution in a large set of areas.  The Bicameral Commission was the most serious
attempt made to change the Constitution in Italy in recent years,
52 all the leaders of the main
Italian parties were part of this Commission. Surprisingly enough, the Commission did not fail
on “fiscal federalism” but on the reform of the electoral laws. At the end, the Italian political
parties had found a good compromise to transform Italy in a federal state (see next section).
6.  The Italian Debate on Fiscal Federalism
In anticipation of the constitutional reform, a lively academic and political debate took place in
Italy in the mid-1990s. Because of the central role played by the “soft budget constraint” in local
public finance, most of the proposals focused on ways to eliminate or reduce this problem. The
main idea was to introduce a clearer  separation between the central and local levels of
government by reducing the overlap of spending competencies and by increasing the role of own
resources in the finances of local governments.
53 Furthermore, to increase accountability of local
governments, it was suggested that the resources assigned to local governments should be
unearmarked. As we saw above, to some extent at least these ideas were implemented in the
1990s.
                                                          
52 Other attempts were made in 1989 and in 1993; they all failed.
53 Most of the discussion was in terms of which own tax bases to assign to regions, and in terms of which state tax
bases to share with regions. The introduction of Irap has somewhat settled this issue.36
However, this was certainly not enough to avoid entirely the risk of ex post intervention
and bailouts by the central government. Most writers were convinced that more radical policies
were necessary. Forbidding the central government to bail out local governments by law had
already proved to be unfeasible; thus, other ways had to be found to make such an intervention
more difficult or almost impossible.
According to Giarda (1995), Northern and Southern regions had to be treated separately
given their different economic endowments of resources. Northern regions should become
entirely independent from the center. They should set the rates for their own taxes and receive a
fixed share of national taxes to guarantee complete coverage of their expenditures
54 other than
those for exceptional reasons (such as natural catastrophes and war).  Any further central
government intervention should be prohibited by law, or even better, the Constitution. In this
way, regional expenditures would be determined entirely by regional own resources, and regions
would have enough flexibility on the revenue side to express their autonomy. In contrast, the
much poorer Southern regions should at least partially be financed by the central government
through vertical transfers.
Bordignon et al. (1996), Bosi and Tabellini (1995), Brosio et al. (1994), and others have
advocated a more radical version of the same idea. All regions, Northern and Southern, would be
made completely independent from the central government, giving them enough resources to
finance entirely their regional expenditures. A number of tax bases should be given exclusively
to regions, allowing them to freely determine tax rules, tax rates, and tax enforcement. Vertical
transfers should be abolished and replaced by horizontal transfers, which would be computed by
using a pre-established formula (written in the Constitution). The parameters of this formula
would be estimated periodically by a commission consisting of representatives of all regions and
the central government.
55 Horizontal financing, similar to the arrangement in Germany, would
harden the budget constraint of the regions. Direct transfers from the North to the South would
also be more transparent  than the hidden transfers that currently go through the central
government budget. As a result, bailouts would be more difficult.
                                                          
54 “Standard” expenditure and with reasonable assignments for health expenditure. In passing, it should be noted that
Piero Giarda, an eminent academic public economist who had played the political role of vice-minister in the
Ministry of Treasure since 1995, has been the key character behind most of the decentralization which occurred in
Italy during the period.
55 In the case of Constitutional reform, this Commission should have been under the control of the second chamber
or regional Senate.37
In the end, the first proposal won the day. The text approved by the Bicameral
Constitution implicitly contained this idea.  Southern regions—and their representatives in the
national parliament—saw stronger safeguards in a proposal that maintained a key role of the
central government in territorial redistribution. The first proposal also had the advantage of
allowing for a “two-speed” devolution process. According to this approach, Italian regions would
be assigned a set of available functions by the Constitution; and in any given period each region
would have chosen from this set which functions to administer from that period on. The central
government would then give to all regions the resources necessary to finance their new
functions. Critics to this solution (including the present writer) pointed out that this would turn
into an administrative nightmare, with different overlaps of competencies in different parts of the
country, and with the possibility that the transition to a federal state would never end. In fairness,
however, it must be recognized that the Bicameral proposal was probably the only one that could
have been adopted in Italy at the time; the resistance of the South to a more extensive
decentralization would otherwise probably have stopped the process altogether.
56
7.  Conclusions
The Italian history of local public finance provides a good example of what should not be done
to avoid bailouts and fiscal irresponsibility. Some of the problems we illustrated above are
country-specific and cannot be easily generalized. However, in our view, some general lessons
emerge from our account.
First, the Italian experience certainly supports the theoretical (Eichengreen and von
Hagen, 1996) and empirical (Stein, 1999) literature suggesting that a coherent assignment of own
resources and functions to local governments is essential to avoid the soft-budget constraint
phenomenon. When grants by the central government cover more than 80 percent of the
resources of local governments, as has happened in Italy, there is simply no hope of enforcing
sound public finances at the local level. Since the cost of raising local expenditures is largely
borne by non-residents, local governments have a clear tendency to free-ride against each other.
In principle, a “strong” central government, able to internalize the negative externalities across
                                                          
56 Two other positive features in the Bicameral Proposal should be recalled. First, as is the case in most federalist
countries, the residual financing of municipalities and provinces through grants was to be assigned to regions and
jointly decided by regions and local authorities representatives in the second national chamber. Second, each region
would have been allowed to choose freely its own electoral system.38
local autonomies, may counteract these pressures (i.e., Borge and Rattso, 1999). However, when
the central government is also as “weak” as in Italy, the incentives to accommodate pressures for
high expenditures at local level become simply irresistible.
The Italian experience also suggests that the mere removal of vertical fiscal imbalance
alone is not enough to eliminate the incentives to overspend at local level. Larger fiscal
autonomy at the regional level in the health sector and even a law explicitly prohibiting the
central government from eventually footing local bills were not enough to enforce a hard budget
at the regional level. The problem here lies in the attribution of political responsibility across
different levels of government. As long as it is not clear which level of government is
accountable for a given service, expectations of bailouts by the central government tend to be
self-fulfilling. In Italy, the central government cannot allow a region to go bankrupt in the health
sector for the simple reason that it would itself be blamed for this failure. This is why the Italian
debate on fiscal federalism insisted so much on a better separation of functions and competencies
between different level of governments.
Second, the Italian experience also has something to say on the theory of bailouts in
intergovernmental relationships (i.e., Wildasin, 1997; Qian and Roland, 1998).  This theory
suggests that two elements are important in determining the probability of a bailout: the size of
the localities and the magnitude of the externalities across jurisdictions. The larger the
externalities associated with local expenditures, the stronger is the motivation for the central
government to intervene. The larger the local government, the more difficult it is for the central
government to commit not to bail out that locality. The first prediction is somewhat supported by
the Italian experience;
57 the second is not. Although the issue deserves more serious empirical
research, prima facie evidence in the Italian context suggests that, on the contrary, larger local
governments are more fiscally responsible than smaller governments. One explanation is the fact
that the incentive to  free-ride may be smaller for large localities, as a larger part of their
expenditures is supported by residents through the central government budget. For instance, it
seems unlikely that the richest Italian region, Lombardia, which alone produces more than 30%
of the total revenue of the country,
58 would not consider that in the case of a bail-out, a large part
of the extra burden would be carried by its own citizens. On theoretical grounds, this suggests
                                                          
57 Indeed, health services can be thought of as a case where externalities are very large.
58 The city of Milan alone, with slightly more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, generates more than 10% of all national
revenue from the highly progressive personal income tax.39
considering in more detail the characteristics of the revenue system (e.g., the degree of
progressivity of the personal income tax) when assessing the relationship between the size of a
local government and the likelihood of a bailout.
The Italian experience also suggests paying more attention to the characteristics of local
government financing when modelling local government behavior. The very large share of grant
financing in Italy distorts the behavior of local politicians towards lobbying with the central
government rather than an efficient provision of local public goods. Generalizing, this suggests
that in cases where grant financing at the local level is substantial, it may be more useful to view
the relationships between the different level of governments as a lobbying process (Persson and
Tabellini, 1994).
Third, the Italian experience shows that institutions, and particularly constitutional rules,
matter even in the context of intergovernmental relationships. As we argued above, at the root of
the  centralization undertaken by Italian governments in the 1970s, which generated the
subsequent problems of soft budget constraints, is a constitutional problem. The 1948
Constitution did not set precise rules for financing at the local governments, allowing the central
government to centralize all revenues in the mid-1970s. Also, most of the problems regarding the
overlap of competencies among different levels of government derive from a constitutional
failure. There is little hope of enforcing a change in the local governments behaviour without a
constitutional change separating the functions and the resources of the different levels of
government and allowing the country to commit credibly to a decentralization process.
Finally, the Italian experience suggests that  decentralization and redistribution,
particularly geographical redistribution, do not go well together. Judging by the Italian
experience,
59 one can have high levels of territorial redistribution or one can have efficient local
governments; having both is likely to be a chimera. Attempting to enforce a uniform provision of
local public goods with very different endowments of resources at the local level ends up by
increasing the role of transfers in local government financing and by strongly constraining the
behavior of local governments. Fiscal irresponsibility at the local level is likely to result,
stimulating problems of soft budget constraints.
                                                          
59 And by the German one. See  Seitz (2000) for an account of the German intergovernmental redistribution system
after unification.40
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